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Abstract 
As  we  look  to  the  future  management  and development  of the  Nile  River  Basin  Water 
Resources through  the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI),  it is useful to review the  challenges faced 
by the  Kagera  Basin Organisation (KBO) and their impact on its performance. The KBO was 
established  with  the  primary  goal  of alleviating  poverty  and  achieving  socio~economic 
development  in  the  Kagera  Basin.  It  met  this  objective  with  mixed  results.  Its 
underperformance has generally been attributed to an ambitious mandate that stretched way 
beyond the functions of a River Basin Organisation and the Kagera's territorial jurisdiction. In 
a progressive institution,  such a mandate would have presented increased opportunities for 
trade~ffs among the participants. But because the KBO was built on a weak social resources 
foundation,  it  lacked  the  adaptive  capacity  to  survive  the  historical,  political  and  cultural 
dynamics between the riparians. 
The paper,  thus,  explores the concept of Institutional Adaptive Capacity and the interaction of 
technical  and  social ingenuity as critical  success  factors  in  institutional  development  and 
sustenance.  A lesson learnt from  the  KBO experience is that a sustainability level of social 
resources will be required to  identify,  define and deploy the appropriate development,  reform 
and adaptation mechanisms to transform the NBI into a lasting regime of  cooperation. 
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Historical Background 
The  Kagera  Basin  Organisation  (KBO)  was  established  in  1977 as  a  result  of diplomatic 
initiatives to  operationalise the  concept of regional  and  basin-wide planning  in  the  Kagera 
Basin.  The  first  step  was taken  in  1969 when  a  United  Nations Development  Programme 
(UNDP)  fact  finding  mission,  in  consultation  with  the  governments  of  Burundi,  Rwanda, 
Tanzania  and  Uganda,  recommended  that  a  technical  committee  be  established  to 
coordinate  orderly  regional  planning.  The  committee  was  established  between  Burundi, 
Rwanda  and  Tanzania;  Uganda  preferring  to  participate  in  an  observer role.  In  1970,  the 
committee  submitted  a  successful  funding  proposal  to  the  UNDP  for  the  Kagera  Basin 
Development studies, which were launched in 1971. The first phase, which lasted up to 1973, 
consisted  largely  of data  collection  and  analysis,  with  emphasis  on  tourism;  hydropower 
potential;  fisheries;  and  institutional  arrangements.  This  data,  together  with  the  national 
priorities of the three States, then formed the basis for the preparation of the Indicative Basin 
Plan that was submitted in  1976 at the end of Phase II. The committee also commissioned a 
separate study on  harnessing hydroelectric power at Rusomo Falls on  the  Kagera,  and  the 
environmental  and  commercial implications of such a development. From the initial findings 
of these  studies,  it  was clear that all  the  riparian  States shared common  problems in  most 
fields  of economic and social development; and that a medium was required through which 
the  basin's development potential could  be realised by jointly coordinating the  planning and 
exploitation  of  the  sub-region's  resources.  And  so  it  was  that  on  August  24,  1977  the 
Agreement  establishing  the  Organisation  for  the  Development  and  Management  of  the 
1 Kagera  River Basin, commonly known  as  the  KBO,  was  signed  between  Burundi,  Rwanda 
and Tanzania at Rusomo. Uganda acceded to it in 1981. 
At its  inception,  it  was  envisaged  that  the  KBO  would  deal,  and  I quote Article  IV  of the, 
Treaty,  "all  questions  relevant to  the  activities to  be  carried  out in  the  Kagera  Basin"(FAO,  ! 
1997: 37). After two donor support mobilisation conferences, in  Paris in  1979 and  Geneva in 
1982, the organisation's governing organs finally articulated this objective into the conduct of 
studies  for  the  implementation  of  fourteen  priority  projects  in  four  key  sectors  namely: 
Transport and Communications; Energy; Agriculture; and  Information and Training. By 1992, 
project documents and  feasibility study  reports  had  been  prepared for most of the  projects. 
However,  there was limited success in  raising funds for their implementation. At the time of 
its  dissolution,  this  list of projects  had  further been  prioritised  into four:  the  Rusomo  Falls 
Hydroelectric Power Project;  Phase  \I  of the  Tsetsefly and Trypanosomiasis Control Project; 
the  Rehabilitation of the Miramira  Hill-Ntungamo-ishaka  road;  and  the  Rehabilitation of the 
Mutukula-Bukoba-Biharamulo-Lusahanga  road.  The  presentation  of  funding  proposals  for 
these projects to the donors was scheduled for June 1995 but had  to  be called off following 
1he April to July 1994 war in Rwanda. 
KBO's performance 
Though  institutions are  much  broader than  mere  organisations,  a review of the factors that 
influence  institutions  is  necessary  for  a  fair  assessment  of  the  KBO's  performance. 
Institutional  literature  lists  some  of these  factors  as  historical  precedents.  constitutional 
provisions.  political  arrangements,  demographic  conditions,  resources  endowment,  and 
economic  development.  Thus,  the  process  of  institutional  design  and  the  resulting 
frameworks,  policy  and  administrative  arrangements  are  invariably  a  reflection  of  the 
particular  blend  of these  factors,  which  in  turn  defines  the  goals  and  objectives  of any 
institution (Bromley, 1989a. 1989b; Commons, 1968; North, 1990). 
For  the  KBO,  the  overriding  need  was  to  disenclave  its  landlocked  hinterland  and,  in  the 
process,  provide  opportunities  to  exploit  the  sub-region's  hitherto  untapped  natural 
resources.  Its  original  mandate  extended  way  beyond  the  Kagera  river  catchment  and 
reflected  a development  agenda  expected  more of a regional  development agency than  a 
River Basin Organisation (RBO). None of its wide array of projects was in  line with such core 
functions  of a RBO  as  hydrological  studies,  pollution  control,  environmental  protection,  or 
ecological conservation.  In this context, the overall performance of the KBO is relatively more 
difficult to  assess for neither the  criteria for evaluating a development agency nor that for a 
RBO  seem appropriate. And since the KBO's Indicative Basin Plan read  more like a specific 
project development list than  a development strategy,  its  performance can  be  evaluated  in 
terms  of the  extent  to  which  the  Priority  Action  Programme
1  (PAP)  was  implemented.  Its 
achievements on this front included: 
The  KBO  regional  telecommunications  project:  This  was  the  organisation's  main 
achievement.  With  funds from  the  African  Development Bank.  interconnection  between  the 
four  member States'  Capitals and  a number of key  towns  was  made  possible  using  high 
quality terrestrial microwave links and modern switching equipment. This eliminated the need 
to  route  calls  through  Europe,  and  not only  reduced  the  costs of making  calls  within  East 
Africa but also improved the quality of connection.  Rwanda and  Burundi gained direct access 
to the East African Telecommunications network - with the possibility of tapping into the main 
PANAFTEL  network  for  Eastern  and  Central  Africa,  while  Uganda  had  the  opportunity  of 
1 A list of 14 projects in  the four key sectors of Transporl and Communications; Energy; Agriculture; and 
Information and Training,  which was arrived at after the donor community advised that the Indicative Basin 
Plan  was too incomplete for funding consideration. 
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opportunity of being connected to Southern Africa. This was a major step towards improving 
trade and commerce with the outside world. 
But being one of four projects that were intended to meet the primary goal of opening up the 
landlocked  interior,  this  was  a  modest  achievement.  The  railways  project,  in  which  two 
branch lines would connect Rwanda and Burundi to the East African Community (EAC) grid 
through the  port of  Bukoba;  the roads  rehabilitation programme; and the navigability of the 
Kagera never got beyond the feasibility study stage. 
The KBO regional centre for economic documentation: The centre was set up  in  Kigali 
as  part  of the  Human  Resources  Development project  portfolio.  Funded  by  the UNDP,  it 
boasted
2  of a collection of  over 8,000 items that included reference books,  periodicals and 
project study reports and  documents; and  a  modern Statistical  Data Bank and Information 
Service.  It  was to serve the purpose of acquiring, storing and disseminating information to 
the  KBO Secretariat, specialists a,ld consultants participating in the organisation's activities 
and other relevant bodies in the member States. 
The Kagera Polytechnic Institute, which was the other project in this portfolio, was shelved in 
part due to its intended beneficiaries preferring to study abroad. 
The tsetsefly and trypanosomiasis control project: This was one of  six projects  under 
the  Agriculture  Sector.  Under  this  project,  the  Economic  Commission  for  Africa's 
International  Centre  of  Insect  Physiology  and  Ecology  ECAJICIPE  conducted  vector 
distribution  surveys  and  trials  on  various  control  methodologies  in  the  heavily  infested 
(former) Akagera Park region.  It is on the basis of this that the full-scale control programme 
was to be launched. This, however, was not implemented due to funding constraints. 
The  Rusomo Hydroelectric project, which at the organisation's inception was conceived as 
the key to industrial activity in  the basin areas of Burundi,  Rwanda and Tanzania ended up 
being the subject of several inconclusive studies. Thus, in terms of implementing the Priority 
Action Programme, the KBO clearly under performed. Indeed viewed in  financial terms, only 
US $18.75 million
3  of the budgeted US $3 billion capital cost of the PAP was mobilised. This 
represents  a huge investment gap and,a failure to capture the interest of  potential funding 
agencies.  Also,  considering  that  member  contributions  averaged  about  30%  of  funding 
requirements, it could be that its architects overestimated the members' financial capacity to 
meet regime costs or that the riparian states lacked faith in the organisation. 
Adaptive capacity: an alternative evaluation criteria 
As  Rangley et al (1994) concluded, the organisation's overextended mandate and a lack of 
clear objectives were key factors that influenced its performance, but going by Waterbury's 
(2002)  argument,  extending the agenda to include non-water related sectors presented an 
opportunity for  increased trade-ofts between the riparians  which  was not  exploited.  Which 
brings  into  question  the  role  social  resources,  or  their  lack  of,  played  in  the  KBO's 
performance. 
The social resources referred to in this context can be defined as the ability of administrative 
organs and managers responsible for natural resources utilisation to deploy the appropriate 
development, reform and adaptation mechanisms for management organisations to function' 
in  essence Adaptive Capacity (see Homer-Dixon, 2000, 1994; Ohlsson, 1999; Serengeldin, 
Aster,  1994; Turton,  2002;  Turton,  1999,  2000).  Social  resources determine the openness 
and flexibility of an institution thus defining the progressiveness of an institution in the face of 
emerging  problems. They form  the  required  foundation  upon  which  policy  options  and  or 
AlmoSl all of its collection of equipment and materials were looted in the 1994 civil war in  Rwanda. 

3  the cost of constructing the Headquarters and regional offices buildings. 

3 p 
strategies  can  subsequently  be  built.  A  sound  principle  is  that  for  the  development  of  a 
functional  institutional framework,  a level  of  social resources corresponding to the required 
level of  adaptation to the increasing complexities of natural resources development must be 
achieved and maintained. A failure to meet and sustain this level would mean the failure of 
the institution. 
Continuing with the construction analogy, we find that the pillars of institutional development 
are technical ingenuity on the one hand and social ingenuity on the other. 
Technical ingenuity deals with the creation of the capacity to  manipulate the environment 
in  order  to  develop  and  utilise  natural  resources.  In  institutional  design,  this  forms  the 
structural component whose construction parts are the technical and financial aspects of the 
Institutional arrangements.  It  lays  out the procedural rules;  the actors; the mechanisms for 
creating  capacity in  data  generation,  capture,  processing  and  sharing;  and the  intellectual 
capital needed to  interpret the data in  order to generate and implement viable strategies or 
policy options. This is  a well-covered subject in  institutional literature upon which we  will  not 
dwell much  (see Bromley,  2000;  Carlsson, 2001; North. 1990; Young.  1989,1980; Young, 
Osherenko, 1993). 
Social ingenuity as an aspect of management institutional development is often mentioned 
in  passing,  but  has  not  been  explored  in  depth  as  a  critical  success  factor  in  regime 
formation.  It constitutes the social element of  regime formation that determines the level  of 
success that can be achieved when creating an enabling environment for: 
• 	 inspiring commitment to the institutional arrangements among stakeholders; 
• 	 the regime to generate strategies or policy options that are perceived as  being both 
reasonable and legitimate by the stakeholders; and 
• 	 the  institutional  organs to  develop adaptive mechanisms  with  which  to ensure that 
the regime is not held hostage by 'high-politics' especially if the latter is characterised 
by tense relations between riparians. 
Perceptions are therefore very important especially among sovereign States whose interests 
are  dynamic.  It  is  for  the  purpose  of  understanding  these  perceptions  and,  where 
appropriate,  changing  them  or  instituting  reforms  to  adapt  to  them  that  makes  social 
ingenuity an indispensable element of regime formation. 
Obviously, these two pillars, technical and social ingenuity, cannot be developed in isolation 
from  one another.  Yet in  the case  of  the  KBO,  all  the activities leading up to  the  Rusomo 
Treaty focussed entirely on the technical aspects of the regime with  no attempt whatsoever 
to explore the social  resources that would legitimise the regime for its  intended actions and 
thus garner member commitment and, more importantly, eliminate the donor skepticism that 
undermined its  existence.  In  developing countries,  exogenous support from  such  actors  as 
aid donors, specialised agencies and financial institutions plays a central role in  institutional 
development. Similarly for the KBO,  the UNDP and the  Kingdom of  Belgium played such a 
central  role  in  the  activities  to  justify  the  KBO's  formation  and  its  design  that  even  the 
Rusomo  treaty  was  based  on  a  draft  prepared  by two  UNDP  consultants
4  Under  such 
circumstances, the social component was  required to develop a mechanism to  adapt these 
arrangements  to  the  historical,  cultural  and  political  conditions  that  existed  among  the 
riparians.  It  goes  without  saying  that  the  negotiating  dynamics  leading  to  successful 
establishment of  wateJ management accords vary from basin to basin  and  as  such there is 
no global applicability (Cano,  1986; Marty,  2001;  Mitchell,  1990),  which  is  why there was  a 
need for feedback to take place between the technical and social components of the KBO's 
establishment. 
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This  oversight was  actually  thE"  KBO's  undoing.  In  failing  to  deploy the  appropriate  social 
resources  to  engender a  culture  that  would  enable  the  riparian  States  to  sacrifice  some 
constituency interests and focus on the goal of alleviating poverty, the riparian States failed to 
achieve internal cohesion and commitment. In so doing, they failed to assure aid donors and 
credit institutions, on  whose technical and financial support the  organisation was to rely,  of 
the successful implementation of the joint development projects. This argument can  best be 
appreciated  with  an  analysis  of the  design  flaws  and  oversights  that  ultimately  failed  the 
organisation. 
Why the KBO Underperformed 
The KBO as the East African Community's replacement 
The fact that efforts to establish the KBO followed immediately in  the wake of the decline of 
the  East  African  Community  (EAC),  and  were  championed  by  Tanzania  was  not  a 
coincidence.  In  the lead  up to the collapse of the  EAC,  Uganda and Tanzania had  for long 
complained of the inequalities in the benefits derived from the Union, notably: 
•  Due to disparate levels of development levels of development, trade within the de facto 
common  market was heavily in  favour of Kenya,  and  because most industries in  the 
Union  had  their  headquarters  in  Nairobi,  Kenya  also  received  a  lion's  share  of the 
customs and other revenues; 
•  Nairobi was the seat of most of the Commission's establishments which did  not augur 
well with Uganda and Tanzania; and 
•  Tanzania justifiably complained of not being served well by the transport system under 
the  Union, specifically the railway lines which were too short and  only the light aircraft 
of the East African Airlines flew to Dar es salaam. 
And  when  Kenya  refused  to  ratify the  1964 Kampala  AgreementS the  central tenet of which 
was the relocation of certain industries away from Kenya, it was only a matter of time before 
the EAC would break up. This was not lost on Tanzania, which sought another avenue for the 
achievement of her long-term goal of attaining socio-economic development through regional 
integration. 
Also recall that this was around the time when  the  government of Tanzania  had just issued 
what  has  come  to  be  known  as  the  Nyerere  Doctrine  on  State  Succession  to  Treaties. 
outlining the policy of Tanzania on  the use of the waters of Lake Victoria and  its catchment 
area,  which  had  invariably been  adopted  by the  governments of Uganda,  Kenya.  Rwanda 
and  Burundi.  Building  on  these  sentiments,  and  presenting  the  EAC's  replacement  as  an 
entity that would deal with  Burundi. Rwanda and Uganda's handicap of being landlocked by 
facilitating  their  trade  and  transport  with  the  outside  world,  Tanzania  had  no  difficulties 
enlisting the support of the other Kagera riparians in the formation of the KBO. The overriding 
goal  was  to  fill  the void  left by the  collapse of the  EAC.  The  EAC  having  been  a regional 
trading block, it is no wonder that the KBO had the semblance of a development agency with 
the  development  of the  Kagera  River  basin  water  resources  as  an  incidental  part  of its 
mandate. 
Thus established,  and  following  donor feedback on  the  articulation of objectives, a healthy 
interaction  of social  and  technical  ingenuity was  required  to restructure  the  organisation  in 
ways  that would  enhance  donor interest.  What follows  is an  account of the  key  historical, 
political and  cultural factors that clearly illustrate social  resources as the lacking interceding 
variable in this re-orientation process. 
5 Based on the Jeremy Raisman Commission's recommendations for correcting trade imbalances in  East 
Africa (East African Economic and Fiscal Commission,  1961) 
5 The Amin - Nyerere clash of personalities 
What has been said of friendships among  countries in  Africa being ultimately dependent on 
the  friendships,  at  a  personal  level,  of their  leaders  came  to  pass  in  this  incident  when 
General  Idi  Amin  Dada  overthrew  President  Apollo  Milton  Obote,  a  personal  friend  of 
Mwalimu Julius Nyerere. President Nyerere refused to accept Amin's leadership and despite 
Uganda and  Tanzania  sharing grievances with  regard  to the  direction the  EAC was taking, 
Nyerere refused  to  recognise Amin's nominated delegates to the  EAC.  Instead, he accused 
Amin  of  withdrawing  the  recognised  delegates  (nominated  by  Obote)  without  prior 
consultation.  He  made  no  secret of his wish  to have  no  dealings with  President Amin  and, 
thus, Obote's fall arguably dealt the final blow to the EAC. 
But  for  the  customary  law  requirement  that  the  implementation  of  projects  on  shared 
watercourses  be  consented  to  by  all  riparians,  President Nyerere  would  have  preferred  to 
deal with  only Rwanda and  Burundi.  President Amin  for his part opted  to  restrict  Uganda's 
involvement  in  the  KBO  to  that  of  observation  thereby  undermining  the  utility  of  the 
organisation  since  studies  could  only  be  carried  out in  three  of the  riparian  countries.  And 
when  Uganda acceded to the  treaty, the  organisation's administrative arrangements had  to 
be  restructured  to  accommodate  the  Ugandan  delegation,  something  that  did  nothing  to 
improve the coordination of activities. 
Ethnic tension 
The  Hutu-Tuts;  friction,  carried  over  from  the  Belgian  colonial  microcosm,  further 
compounded  the  organisation's  lack  of  internal  cohesion.  Before  implementing  their 
colonisation  policy  of 'Les  ref  ormes  voison',  the  Belgians  took  time  to  study  the  Chiefly 
hierarchy in the kingdoms of Rwanda and Burundi, and the system of indirect administration 
bequeathed  by  the  Germans.  They  concluded  that  the  Tutsi  Chiefs  were  more  active, 
intelligent,  progressive  and,  thus,  best suited to work with  the  government (Prunier,  1995). 
This eventually led to a situation of almost total dominance of the administrative functions of 
Rwanda-Urundi  by the  Tutsis.  The  words  rutsi,  whiqh  originally described the  status of an 
individual  rich  in  cattle,  became  a  term  referring  to  the  elite  group;  and  the  word  Hutu, 
meaning  subordinate  or follower of a more  powerful  person,  came  to  refer to the  mass  of 
ordinary  people  (de  Forges,  1999).  With  pressure  from  the  United  Nations  (UN),  which 
supervised the administration of Rwanda-Urundi under the  trusteeship system, the  Belgians 
initiated changes to increase Hutu participation in publi9 life toward  the  end of their rule. This 
culminated  in  the  Hutu  Revolution  in  the  Republic  of Rwanda,  but  the  Tutsi  dominated 
government ruthlessly put down similar efforts in Burundi. 
The Tutsi - Hutu friction between two of the founder members of the KBO  spilt over to the 
running  of  the  organisation,  resulting  in  such  counter  productive  measures  as  different 
delegations objecting to projects that seemed to be more beneficial to the politically dominant 
group  in  either country;  and where  such  objections were  overcome, there were incidents of 
individual  States  failing  to  send  agreed  delegations  to  donor  countries  and  institutions  to 
mobilise resources to implement the projects. 
Franco - Anglo competition 
Also set in  the  region's  colonial  history are  the  effects of Franco-Anglo competition  on  the 
performance of the  KBO.  Within the  donor community, Tanzania's leading role  in  the  KBO's 
establishment no doubt played into  French and  Belgian fears of an  Anglo-Saxon erosion  of 
their position on the continent - a fear that was not helped by the appointment of the first two 
Executive Secretaries from Tanzania (1978 -1982) and Uganda (1983 - 1987). This despite 
the  fact  that  Uganda  onll  acceded  to  the  treaty  in  1981.  This  situation  was  further 
exacerbated  by  Tanzania's  lean  towards  the  Communist  Camp  in  the  politics  of the  Cold 
War. 
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Among the riparian States, Franco -- Anglo competition was a key factor in the lack of internal 
cohesion, which in turn had an  impact on the organisation's overall performance. Tiharuhondi 
(2001: 6) cites the highest tension as having been witnessed in the period 1978 -- 1982 when 
two  of the  organisation's  depClrtmental  directors  "concentrated  on  highlighting  the  political 
differences between their countries to the detriment of the organisation's development." 
Civil wars and non water related disputes among riparian States 
Political  differences and  mistrust  between  member States were  further exacerbated  by  the 
1990 Rwandese Patriotic Front's (RPF) invasion of Rwanda from Uganda. Since the majority 
of the  invading  forces  had  been  members  of Uganda's  National  Resistance  Army  (NRA), 
President  Juvenial  Habyarimana  accused  his  Ugandan  counterpart  of  having  aided  the 
invasion. 
With three (Rwanda -- Burundi and Rwanda - Uganda) of the four member States harbouring 
deep  suspicions  of each  other,  the  impact on  the  organisation's  activities was  that timely 
decisions could  not be taken on  many KBO activities. The invasion also marked the start of 
the  civil  war in  Rwanda  that paved  way  for the  1994 genocide.  Together with  the  internal 
conflicts  in  Burundi,  this  meant that it was  impossible  to  continue  with  project studies  and 
implementation work in about 55% of the KBO's territorial jurisdiction. 
Lack of commitment 
Though the treaty did not provide for the assembly of the Heads of State, who comprised the 
Summit - which was one of the organisation's three institutional organs, the others being the 
Council  of Ministers  and  the  Intergovernmental  Commission  of Experts  -- it  provided  for 
annual  meetings.  But such was  the  lack of commitment to the  organisation that prior to  its 
dissolution in 2004, the Summit last met in 1993 while the Council of Ministers only met twice 
in the same period. And even when the meetings took place, they ended up being more like 
talking shops, for none of the rf)aolutions taken were ever effected. 
Lessons learnt and reflected in the Nile Basin Initiative 
The  formal  dissolution of the KBO on  7 July 2004 followed  a decision taken at the  January 
2000  Extra-ordinary KBO  Council of Ministers meeting that KBO activities be  transferred to 
the  EAC when  it is  reactivated, and  Rwanda  and  Burundi are admitted as  members.  Since 
then  the Nile  Basin  Initiative (NBI) has taken  particular interest in  two of the  projects  in  the 
KBO's portfolio -- the Rusomo Hydroelectric power project, and the navigability of the Kagera 
River  - and  agreement  has  been  reached  for  them  to  be  implemented  under  the  Nile 
Equatorial Lakes Subsidiary Action Programme (NELSAP). 
As a background, the NBI was launched in  1999 as a transitional mechanism for cooperation 
in the pursuit of sustainable development and management of the Nile waters. Its goal is set 
out as lito achieve sustainable socio-economic development through the  equitable utilisation 
of,  and  benefit from  the common  Nile  Basin water resources."  (NBI,  World  Bank,  2001:  2). 
This  is  to  be  achieved  through  a  two  tier  Strategic Action  Programme  comprising  of the 
Shared Vision Programme (SVP), of technical assistance and capacity building projects to be 
implemented  basin-wide  as  a  means  of creating  an  enabling  environment for cooperative 
development;  and  the  Subsidiary Action  Programme  (SAP),  comprising of joint investment 
projects.  Two  groupings  for  the  SAP  have  formed,  one  within  the  Eastern  Nile  (ENSAP) 
including Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia, while the other covers the Nile Equatorial Lakes Region 
(NELSAP) with  the  six countries  in  the  southern  portion  of the  basin,  namely  Burundi,  the 
Democratic  Republic of Congo  (ORC).  Kenya,  Rwanda,  Tanzania and  Uganda,  as  well  as 
Sudan  and  Egypt.  A Coordination Unit (NEL-CU) has been  established for NELSAP with  a 
mandate  to  build  national  institutional  capacity  for  sub-ba~in  cooperation  in  the 
implementation of the activities of NELSAP. Key among these activities is the creation of an 
enabling  environment  for  the  development  of  a  jOint  strategy  for  the  water  allocation 
7 negotiations and  a framework for a permanent institution to manage the water resources in 
the Kagera River Basin  (NEL~COM,  2001). 
Evidently,  there  are  parallels  between  the  KBO  and  the  NBI  and  a  review  of the  KBO's 
performance  would  certainly inform the  process of developing  a sustainable  framework for 
cooperation whether in the Lake Victoria basin or the  Nile Basin  as  a whole. It makes place 
for the following key lessons. 
Political stability and support 
It is conventional wisdom regarding cooperation on shared watercourses that results can best 
be  achieved within a climate of trust, the prerequisites of which  are  internal political stability 
of each  riparian  State;  and  demonstration  of political  commitment  to  shared  river  basin  . 
issues. An  analysis of the SVP reveals that the  objectives of the NBI  were indeed informed 
by  this  wisdom.  What  is  of concern  is  the  prevalence  of the  development  discourse  that 
seems to suggest that economic development is the  necessary and sufficient solution to the 
riparians' problems. 
True the NEL sub~basin is home to three of the world's poorest nations and so it would seem 
logical that jointly implementing investment projects utilising  the  sub  basin  waters will  open 
up these  countries to each  other's ideas,  goods,  services and  labour thus speeding up  the 
process  of poverty  reduction.  But  despite  publicly  extolling  the  virtues  of cooperation,  not 
much  has changed in  the sub-basin political dynamics from what existed at the formation of 
the  KBO. The tensions and  mistrust borne of the  Colonial and,  later, Cold War pOlitics  have 
now  given  way  to  a  complex  mosaic of tensions  characterised  by  national  assertiveness 
especially  among  the  DRC,  Rwanda  and  Uganda.  The  'New  Leadership,6  that  in  the  late 
1980's  and  early  1990's  provided  optimism  for  the  achievement  of  peace  and  the 
improvement  of policy  environments  in  the- SUb-basin  seem  to  have  been  sucked  into  the 
regional political quagmire and  instead harbour deep seated suspicions of each other based 
on  political,  ideological and  sometimes personal differences.  In  fact the  prevailing intra and 
inter  State  mistrust  makes  cross-border  investment  highly  risky,  which  in  turn  makes 
economic development suspect as a key strategy for achieving the  desired cooperation and 
regional  integration.  Interestingly,  the  water  resources  of the  Kagera  catchment  do  not 
feature in any of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Programmes of its riparians. 
Financial resource mobilisation 
A clear lesson from the KBO experience is that a sound financial position is imperative for the 
establishment  of  an  effective  regime.  The  ability  to  meet  the  costs  related  to  regime 
formation;  sustenance;  and  financing  of  investments  certainly  requires  commitment  and 
innovative financing arrangements by governments, donors and the  benefiting community. In 
this  regard,  an  International  Consortium  for  Cooperation  on  the  Nile  (ICCON)  was 
established  to  support  the  NBl's  Strategic Action  Programme.  It  brings  together  the  Nile 
riparian  States;  donor  agencies;  credit  institutions;  private  investors;  and  civil  society, 
professional  and  non-governmental  organisations.  Because  the  NBI  is  a  transitional 
cooperative institution, this funding mechanism is operated as a World  Bank managed Trust 
Fund, the  Nile Basin Trust Fund,  that will eventually be transferred to a Nile Basin Institution 
with appropriate legal status and capacity {NBI, World Bank. 2001}. 
Development strategy 
One of the key criticisms levelled at the KBO  by Rangley et al  (1994). is its focus on project 
based  planning  without  developing  a  strategy  for  identifying  and  evaluating  investment 
opportunities. The  result was a waste of time and  resources studying projects that had  little 
chance  of being  implemented.  This  has  been  addressed  through  a  four-step  process  of 
establishing  the  NELSAP,  cO:lsisting  of in-country analysis  and  project  identification;  inter­
11 Referring to the governments that replaced the dictatorships in the region.  . 
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country  project  conceptualisation;  preparation  of joint  Project  Identification  Documents  for 
submission  at  ICCON  meetings;  and  the  development  of  project  proposals  and 
implementation. Through this process, projects are streamlined and only those deemed to be 
sustainable;  achievable;  and  of significant  shared  benefits  get to  be  presented  at  ICCON 
meetings, which are currently, scheduled to take  place every two to three years (NBI, World 
Bank, 2001). 
Ownership and commitment 
No strategy would be  useful in the absence of ownership by those who would later put it to 
use.  External consultants may be  of assistance but local decision  makers and  communities 
must have a sense of ownership or see a role  for themselves.  The  SVP  anticipates broad 
based  participation  that  also  includes  representatives  of the  general  public,  private  sector 
associations  and  NGOs.  It  is  envisaged  that  this  will  promote  effective  dissemination  of 
information to a wide audience which will in turn provide a means of enhancing stakeholder 
confidence  in  the  NBI.  Within  this  broad  objective,  a  public  information  campaign  will 
encourage  greater  basin-wide  political  engagement  for  cooperation;  promote  a  healthy 
discourse  on  regional  development;  and  raise  public awareness and  understanding  of the 
NBI process (NBI, 2001). 
In pursuing the principle of subsidiarity, the riparians will be able to take full advantage of the 
opportunities in the different geographical areas to address the unique nature of the needs in 
each sub-basin. This may well be the key to sustained riparian commitment. 
A shift from water sharing to benefit sharing 
Realising the practical difficulties of negotiating equitable use formulae against a rich  history 
of conflict and controversy over the utilisation of the Nile waters, the riparians took a historic 
step  towards  a  functional  regime  of cooperation  by  diffusing  focus  from  the  symbolic  but 
inconclusive  issues of water redistribution  to  a redefinition  of the  problem  as  one  of basin 
wide  development with  emphaRis  on  the  benefits of  r~gional cooperation.  The  cooperative 
dialogue  is  aimed at facilitating  a move from  a primarily country focus towards wider need 
and interest, based upon which opportunities for collaboration can be better identified, In due 
course  an  enabling environment for the development of a joint strategy for water allocation 
negotiations will be created, and the process will be made easier by a wider pool of trade-offs 
resulting from the confidence building process. 
Conclusion 
The above discussion of the KBO's  performance would  provide for the  argument that social 
resources  mobilisation and  natural  resources development are two  completely separate yet 
deeply  interrelated  spheres  of  management  institutional  development,  and  the  interaction 
between them is vital to understand when designing management institutions. The need for a 
lasting  regime  of cooperation,  whether  in  the  Lake Victoria  basin  or the  Nile  as  a  whole 
cannot be overemphasised. Yet the region's problematic history of non-cooperation and  the 
prevailing political dynamics present a tremendous challenge to this goal. 
The  NBI's  Shared  Vision  Programme  represents  a  major  attempt  at  overcoming  this 
challenge and, if genuinely implemented, may act as the catalyst for basin-wide cooperation; 
building  trust;  and  ensuring  a comprehensive  approach  to  the  achievement of sustainable 
basin-wide  economic development.  But while  this  programme  lists  sufficient conditions  for 
overcoming  the  current problems,  a sustainability level of social  resources  in  the legal  and 
institutional  dialogue  will  be  required  to  identify,  define  and  deploy  the  appropriate 
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